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ii THE US CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT: 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SAVING 
Charles Engel 
1.  Introduction 
The large United States (US) current account deficits of recent years have been the 
subject of an enormous amount of study in academia, among government and 
central bank economists, in business economics reports, and in the press.1 Many 
different explanations of the cause of the deficit have been offered, and to varying 
degrees we believe that all may have played a role in the evolution of the deficit: 
low private saving in the US generated by financial innovations or asset price 
inflation; large public-sector budget deficits; a ‘glut’ of savings in the rest of the 
world driven by demographic factors in the rich countries and capital market 
imperfections in the emerging markets; and, perhaps even misalignment of the 
nominal exchange rate leading to excessively cheap import prices for the US in the 
short run. 
In this paper we explore the role of one other factor that also has been mentioned 
prominently: private saving in the US is low because income growth is expected to 
be strong in the US. We will discuss briefly some of the other factors that deserve 
consideration, but here our focus is on the question of how much of the current 
account deficit can be understood in the context of a model of optimal saving. We 
rework the standard neoclassical two-country model to show how a country will be 
a net borrower when its future share of world GDP (net of investment and 
government spending) is expected to increase above its current share. 
Figure 1 is the starting point of our analysis. It shows what is perhaps one of the 
most striking economic developments of the last 25 years: the dramatic increase in 
                                           
1  See, for example, Backus et al (2005), Bernanke (2005), Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005), 
Chinn (2005), Clarida, Goretti and Taylor (2005), Edwards (2005), Gourinchas and   
Rey (2005), Kouparitsas  (2005), Kraay and Ventura (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 
2004, 2005), and Truman (2005). The US current account deficit stood at almost 6 per cent of 
GDP in 2004, the largest deficit on record over the last 40 years.  2 
US output relative to the rest of the high-income world. Specifically, the figure 
plots US GDP less government spending and investment as a share of the sum of 
G7 GDP less government spending and investment. We net out government 
spending and investment because our theory suggests that consumption spending 
ultimately depends on income that is available for household consumption, but a 
plot of unadjusted GDP shares looks very similar. The figure also eliminates the 
influence of exchange rate swings by comparing real GDP growth relative to GDP 
shares in 1990, in a way that will be explained in greater detail later. 
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Source: author’s calculations 
The striking thing about this figure is that since some time in the 1980s, the US 
share appears as if it is on an upward linear trend. Its share has increased from a 
trough in 1982 of around 39.5 per cent to its level in 2004 of approximately 
45.3 per cent. Prior to 1982, it appears that the US share fluctuated around a level 
of roughly 40.5 per cent. 
GDP shares capture two factors that are typically considered separately in the 
neoclassical approach to the current account. First, if the country’s income is 
expected to rise, it may borrow now and run a current account deficit. Second, if 
the world interest rate is low, the country’s incentive may be to borrow more now. 
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One factor that may lead to lower interest rates is high saving in the rest of the 
world, which might in turn be generated by poor growth prospects in those 
countries. Typically, the two-country model (in which the world interest rate is 
determined endogenously) has been used when studying a ‘large’ country, such as 
the US. 
Our models recast the neoclassical model to show how we can (under certain 
assumptions) express the optimal consumption path as a function of the current and 
expected future discounted sum of the country’s share of world output (adjusted 
for government spending and investment). This representation is useful because it 
expresses the economic forces in a transparent and intuitive way; it also gives us a 
way of testing the model that does not require modelling of world real interest 
rates. The effects of real interest rates are implicitly captured by the ‘shares’ 
model. For example, if the rest of the world’s income growth is expected to be 
slow, in the standard representation, their high saving will lower interest rates and 
these low rates will stimulate consumption at home. In the ‘shares’ approach, we 
see directly that home borrowing is encouraged by low growth in the rest of the 
world, because that low growth will lead to higher future output shares for the 
home country. 
Another nice feature about the ‘shares’ representation of the two-country model is 
that it applies for countries of any size. There is no difference in the representation 
for countries that are too small to affect world real interest rates, and large 
countries that can. 
Our research ultimately is motivated by the question of whether the US current 
account is ‘sustainable’. The definition of ‘sustainability’ is a bit slippery and 
differs from study to study, and we do not offer a definition here. We begin from 
the observation that while the US is building up debt obligations which may imply 
high debt service obligations in the future, it will almost certainly also be the case 
that US GDP will be much higher in the future. We need some yardstick to 
measure how burdensome those debt service obligations will be in the future. Will 
the US be worse off from its high current spending at the expense of having to 
devote some of future output to servicing its external debt? 
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It seems like the natural way to answer this question is in the context of an 
optimising model. This allows us to compare the trade-off between current and 
future consumption. The way we approach the question is to see whether the high 
level of US spending currently is compatible with an optimal path of borrowing. In 
particular, what assumptions about expected future growth of the US’s share of 
world output could possibly justify its current account deficit? 
It is obvious that the US cannot run primary deficits forever – although even here, 
a caveat is necessary. Figure 2 plots the decline in the US external net asset 
position since 1982. Although there are serious and well-known measurement 
issues, the chart reproduces the conventional wisdom that the US has emerged as a 
large debtor. But Figure 3 shows the US net investment income as a share of GDP. 
That also has declined since 1982, which is consonant with the decline in the US 
asset position. But the decline in investment income has not been nearly as sharp as 
the decline in the net asset position, and the chart shows that US net investment 
income in 2004 was still positive. 
Figure 2: US Net International Investment Position 
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Figure 3: US Net Investment Income 


















Source: author’s calculations 
The usual explanation for this disconnect – that the US is a net debtor, but its net 
investment income is positive – is that the US earns more from its foreign 
investments than foreigners earn from their investments in the US. This in turn is 
explained by the claim that the US external portfolio is dominated by direct 
investment and equities, while foreigners’ portfolio of US assets is dominated by 
holdings of Treasury securities. Whatever the reason, if the US can always earn 
more on its foreign investments than foreigners earn on their investments in the 
US, then indeed even a primary current account deficit could be sustained forever. 
The US could maintain a position of zero net investment income in this situation if 
the ratio of foreign assets that it acquires to US assets acquired by foreigners were 
to equal the rate of return on these US assets relative to the rate of return on foreign 
assets acquired by the US. If the latter ratio is less than one, then the former ratio 
can also be less than one, which implies a primary current account deficit. 
We will abstract from this possibility in our discussions. Primarily we will take an 
approach that sets the current US net investment income to zero, and assumes that 
on future transactions the returns on US borrowing and lending are equal. We 
acknowledge that in some circumstances this may underestimate the future debt 
service obligations of the US if markets have properly priced long-term asset 
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positions. But under the conventional wisdom, this assumption actually is 
conservative. That is, we try to uncover what assumptions about US growth 
relative to the rest of the world would justify the high US current account deficit. 
High US growth combined with low growth in the rest of the world is required. 
The most likely deviation from this situation is one in which total world GDP 
growth turns out to be lower than the markets currently expect. But if that were to 
happen, future short-term interest rates would be lower than those implied by our 
model. The way in which the US could get into trouble with its current debt 
obligations (which we are, in essence, ignoring on the grounds that its current net 
investment returns are not negative) is if interest rates are higher when the current 
debt is rolled over at maturity. But that would require future interest rates to be 
higher than the rates that are implicit in our model, not lower. 
Returning to Figure 1, it is obvious that it is difficult to forecast the US’s future 
share of adjusted G7 GDP. As we have noted, it appears that the US share has been 
on an upward linear trend since some time in the 1980s. But mathematically it is 
impossible for the share to continue upward on a linear trend. If nothing else, the 
trend must stop when the US share reaches one, but obviously it will stop long 
before then. But it is hard to read the tea leaves from Figure 1. Will the US share 
continue to rise, and then level out at a higher share? If so, what will that share be? 
Or will the trend reverse, and the US share return to somewhere around 
40.5 per cent? We consider different scenarios based on alternative econometric 
approaches, but ultimately there is no answer in which we can be very confident. 
Indeed, that is the core conclusion we reach: there is a great deal of uncertainty 
about the future path of the US share of world output. There are certainly plausible 
scenarios in which modest continued growth in the US share could justify high US 
external borrowing today. 
Our study is an exercise in generating intuition about the magnitude of the effect of 
growth in future output shares, rather than a definitive study of the US current 
account. As we noted from the start, there are many factors that contribute to the 
deficit, and we consider only one of them. We perform a delicate balancing act in 
ignoring many of these factors. 
One of the first questions that might be raised is why Figure 1 considers the US 
share of adjusted G7 GDP? If we included China, India, and the east Asian tigers, 
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for example, would not the figure show a falling share? Certainly, the increase in 
the US share would not appear as dramatic if it were to include these countries, but 
we leave them out for good reason. If we were to treat these countries 
symmetrically with the US, the model implies that they should be running large 
current account deficits. Indeed, it is a puzzle that this set of countries, which must 
be expecting high future income growth, have current account surpluses in a world 
of low real interest rates. Bernanke (2005) offers the ‘saving glut’ explanation for 
their behaviour. He argues that this set of countries saves a lot now because they 
do not have full access to world capital markets. The aftermath of the 1997 crisis 
has led outside lenders to be cautious, and required the emerging-market countries 
as a whole to finance investment internally. In addition, some countries (such as 
China) may have been building up a ‘war chest’ as protection against the event of a 
future crisis, even if private capital markets have been willing to lend. And, 
Bernanke notes, the oil-producing countries have had high saving rates recently 
that have been associated with the recent increase in the price of oil. 
From the perspective of the US, the relevant point is that these countries are not 
borrowers on international capital markets. Since they are running current account 
surpluses, they are contributing to the pool of world saving. This increases the 
incentive for any other country to borrow today. It is a conservative assumption on 
our part to ignore this pool of saving in assessing what sort of income growth in 
the US could justify its current low level of saving. 
Of course our neoclassical model could directly incorporate an explanation for the 
glut of saving in the emerging markets, and the extended model could be tested. 
We do not take this approach for three reasons. First, we do not believe the 
exercise of determining optimal behaviour for the US necessarily depends on the 
explanation for the saving glut. Whatever the reason, it will lead to lower interest 
rates than those implied by our model, and imply an even greater incentive for the 
US to borrow. Second, we are intent on examining a simple and intuitive version 
of the model. Third, there is a sense in which the ‘shares’ model can incorporate a 
high desired saving level in the rest of the world in a straightforward way. We can 
simply make the ad hoc assumption that the rest of the world puts a higher weight 
on future utility of consumption than does the US. We show that in this context, 
the optimal deficit for the US is still a weighted average of current and future 
expected output shares. But the model implies, naturally, that the US consumption 
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level will be higher the higher the discount factor (the lower the discount rate) in 
the rest of the world. 
We also do not directly consider demographic explanations for different saving 
rates around the world. There is a sense, however, in which our model does capture 
these effects. We model behaviour in each country as determined by an infinitely-
lived representative household. We do not even consider changes in the number of 
people in each household. Maintaining this fiction, one might suppose that in some 
households, future production will fall (or grow more slowly) as members of the 
household retire and leave the workforce. In other households, income will grow as 
the fraction of working members of the households increases and their output rises. 
In the ‘young’ countries, output is expected to increase more rapidly than in the 
‘old’ countries. From this vantage, demographics can be seen as an underlying 
determinant of income growth, and therefore a driving variable in the 
determination of future output shares. For example, the OECD recently has 
predicted very low GDP growth in the eurozone economies in the decade of the 
2020s.2 The primary reason for this low growth projection is demographic – the 
OECD forecasts a shrinking workforce in these economies. 
One of the most controversial issues that we are sidestepping is the role of the US 
government budget deficits in contributing to the current account deficit. Figure 1 
nets out government spending. To the extent that budget deficits are caused by 
increased public expenditure, we have already factored them into our analysis. 
That is, higher public expenditure implies a lower share of GDP left over for 
private consumption. So we are only trying to explain that part of the US current 
account deficit that cannot be explained by higher government spending. 
On the other hand, our model is based on an infinitely-lived representative 
household, and so the timing of taxes does not matter for consumption decisions. 
That is, Ricardian equivalence holds. In practice, however, it may be that a 
reduction in taxes does not lead to a dollar for dollar increase in private saving. 
The empirical evidence is ambiguous on this point, but our feeling is that Ricardian 
equivalence does not hold. So when we ask whether the saving behaviour of the 
US could be consistent with an optimising framework, we are to some extent 
assuming that the government is using its taxing powers to determine optimal 
                                           
2 See, for example, Martins et al (2005). 
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saving. That is, it lowers taxes in those cases in which it believes that the outcome 
of decisions by private households and businesses leads to too much saving. Put 
another way, the question is whether the tax policy decisions of the government are 
irresponsible, or whether they could be consistent with a responsible government 
that has higher expectations of growth, or possibly a lower discount factor (higher 
discount rate), than the public. In particular, we want to judge whether the 
expected growth or the discount factor that is needed to reconcile the US current 
account with plausible estimates of its future income share is ‘responsible’ or 
‘irresponsible’. 
We examine the current account question entirely from the perspective of a 
neoclassical model. We take this approach because we view the current account 
deficits of the US, and the eventual adjustment of its primary deficit, as a long-run 
phenomenon. This does not mean that short-run considerations are unimportant. 
They certainly might matter for the short run, and Keynesians believe that 
short-run considerations matter for policy. We do not believe, however, that short-
run fluctuations in exchange rates or income will account for much of the long-run 
adjustment process, so we ignore such factors in order to simplify the analysis. 
In Section 2 below, we lay out the basic ‘shares’ model and consider a couple of 
simple generalisations. Section 3 takes up a related issue – does the adjustment of 
the US current account require a large real depreciation? We show that if indeed 
the deficit can be explained by higher future income shares, then the size of the 
required real depreciation may be quite small indeed. Section 4 then provides some 
simple numerical exercises with the model to assess the impact of the role of 
growth in future output shares on the current account. Readers not interested in the 
technical details may want to skip Sections 2 and 3, and head straight for the 
bottom line in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
2.  The Model 
We build a two-country general equilibrium model in which households choose 
consumption optimally over an infinite horizon. We begin with the case in which 
households in each country discount future utility by the same factor, β  (where 
1 0 ≤ < β ), and utility of aggregate consumption is logarithmic (implying a unitary 
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intertemporal elasticity of substitution). We examine the model under the 
assumption of perfect foresight. 
2.1  Equal Discount Factors, Logarithmic Utility 
In general, if preferences are homothetic, we can write a household’s total nominal 
expenditure on consumption as PtCit, where Pt is the exact consumer price index, 
and Cit is the real consumption bundle for household i. If we assume that there are 
N identical households in the home country, then the total national nominal 




the aggregate real consumption index. We can also use the notation Y  to be the 
total nominal value of output in the home country, net of investment and 
government spending. (We use V as the superscript to denote ‘value’.) The 
corresponding variables for the foreign country are labelled with a ‘*’. 
The model we examine is one in which only real values are determined. It is 
helpful to maintain the notion that prices are expressed in terms of a currency, 
because then the symmetry between the home and foreign countries will be clearer. 
But we should interpret all nominal prices as being expressed in a common 
currency, as if these two countries were in a currency union. To reiterate, this is 
merely notational convenience, and has no implications for the results in the 
model. 
We have not assumed that preferences are identical between the home and foreign 
country. A household could, for example, have a home bias in consumption, 
whereby it gives greater weight in preferences to goods produced in its own 
country. There could be non-traded goods, so that only home-country households 
consume home-country non-traded goods, and likewise for foreign households. All 
that we require is that preferences be homothetic, so that we can define 
consumption aggregates for each household and their exact price index. 
We can aggregate across the budget constraint for each household in the home 
country to write: 





















V . (1) 
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Here, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate for period t. Bt is the home country’s 
nominal claims on the foreign country at time t (so that if the home country is a 
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Using this equation and its foreign counterpart, we get: 
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In this derivation we have used the equilibrium condition that the total value of 
world consumption is equal to the total value of world output (net of investment 
and government spending) in each period. We use the notation Y  to denote the 














Substituting Equations (2) and (4) into (1), we get: 
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t t Y Y ≡ γ is the home country’s share of world net GDP at time t. We can 
rewrite this equation slightly, and express nominal consumption at time t as:  
  [ K + + + − + − = + + 2
2




t t t t
Y
B R C P γ β βγ γ
γ
β β ] . (6) 
This is the key equation of our model. It says that the consumption/output ratio for 
a country will depend on the discounted sum of its current and future share of 
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(We have used Equation (4) to substitute out for the equilibrium interest rate.) 
Equation (8) tells us that the home country will tend to have a high ratio of current 
consumption to output when its expected discounted current and future shares of 
world net GDP,  , is high relative to its current share of world net GDP,  t Γ t γ . The 
interest rate does not appear in Equation (8), since it can be solved for in terms of 
the growth rate of world output (and the discount factor) according to Equation (4). 
The relationship in Equation (8) could be consistent with any world growth rate. 
That is, what matters for the country’s consumption/output ratio is its current and 
expected future shares of world output. The higher is its future share of world 
output compared to its current share, the greater will be its consumption/output 
ratio. That is true whether its share of world output is rising because its own output 
is rising faster than the rest of the world’s output is rising, or it is falling less 
quickly than the rest of the world’s output is falling. 
To see how growth in the share of world income might matter, consider this simple 
autoregressive model for the home country’s net GDP share: 






















t t  (10) 
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so the discounted sum of the current and future shares,  t Γ , is a weighted average of 
the current share and the long-run steady-state share, γ . The more weight that 
individuals put on the future in their utility (larger β ) or the faster the convergence 
to the steady-state value (smaller α ), then the greater the importance of the long-
run output share in determining current consumption. 
To get to the empirical model that we will examine in our Carnegie-Rochester 
paper, we use the national income accounting identity, Y , where 
 is the home country’s net export of goods and services (not including interest 
payments on its debt). We can rewrite Equation (6) above as: 
t t t
V
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The current account is given by CA t t t t B R NX ) 1 ( − + = . We propose the following 
approximation:  t tB R ) t t NX CA 1 ( β − + ≈ . Obviously this is not exact, but how far 
off is it? That is, how close is  t tB R ) 1 ( β −  to  t t B R ) 1 ( − ? From the solution for the 
interest rate above, we have that  ) 1 ( β
W
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z ≡ . 
We have derived all of this under perfect foresight. Now we arbitrarily incorporate 
an expectations sign in Equation (13), to get: 
  [ ] K + + − − = + + 2
2
1 ) 1 ( t t t t t t E z γ β βγ β βγ γ . (14) 
If we had derived the model from the beginning under the assumption of 
uncertainty, then Equation (14) would not hold exactly. So Equation (14) is not, 
strictly speaking, derived from the Euler equation under uncertainty and the rest of 
the model. Perhaps future work can assess the error involved with the 
approximations used to derive Equation (14). 
Equation (14) implies a relationship between a country’s current account relative to 
world net GDP ( ) t t z γ  and the country’s current and expected future shares of 
world net GDP. 
2.2  Different Discount Factors, Logarithmic Utility 
Here we briefly consider how Equation (14) would look if the discount factor in 
each country were different. This is a simple way to capture the notion that some 
countries which have very good growth prospects still tend to have high saving 
rates. Equations (1) and (2) still hold, but Equation (3) is replaced by: 
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Substituting into Equation (17): 
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In general,   is not constant over time. It is interesting, however, to see what the 
model implies about the special case when each country’s share is constant over 
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* , (22) 
where  . Compared to the case of equal discount factors 
(
* ) 1 ( β γ γβ β − + ≡
W
0 = t β ), we can now see that the home country’s consumption will be higher if it 
is less patient (has a lower discount factor) than the rest of world. 
Another interesting case is when the country’s share of world net GDP evolves 
according to Equation (9). Although the expression for 
~
 is quite complex, and 
the closed-form solution for Equation (21) is not that intuitive, we can take a linear 
approximation to the solution around the point 
t β
γ γ = t : 
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) 1 )( 1 ( ) )( 1 (
) 1 (













































* ) 1 ( β γ β γ β − + ≡
W . To understand this equation, begin by noting that if 
the share were constant over time so  γ γ = t , then Equation (23) would reduce to 
Equation (22). Also note that if the discount factors were equal, but the shares were 
not constant over time, Equation (23) would reduce to Equation (6), with the 
solution for Γ  from Equation (10) substituted in.  t
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2.3  Same Discount Factors, Non-logarithmic Utility 
Let the utility function each period be given by  ( )
ρ ρ
− −
1 )) 1 ( 1 ( t C . Then the first-
order condition becomes: 














R C . (24) 
In general, we cannot derive anything except in the simple case where there is a 
single homogenous good that is freely traded and consumed in both countries. In 
that case, we might as well take the price as constant. So we can rewrite   





+ = t t t C R C ρ β . (25) 
Adding the equivalent expression for foreign consumption, and using the world 
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The home country’s budget constraint is: 
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The discounted sum of GDP on the right-hand side of Equation (27) can be written 
as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () ()
2
00 0 1 1 2 2
11 1 2
00 0 1 1 2 2
WW W W
WW W W








 ++ +  




Set initial debt to zero so that the expression is easier to look at. Then we can solve 
Equation (27) as follows: 
  () ( ) ( )
































In this case, initial consumption relative to world income is still a weighted 
average of current and future shares of world income. Now the weight given on our 
share in period j is given by: 
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Suppose the growth rate of world income is constant. Then we can rewrite 






















β β Y C . (29) 
This is identical to the expression we had in the case of unit intertemporal elasticity 












t Y Y G 1 + ≡ . Assuming  1 > G , we have  β β <
~
 if  1 > ρ . So, if the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one (that is,  1 > ρ ), then the 
weight on future shares is lower compared to the model which assumes that utility 
is logarithmic. 
While we are unable to generalise beyond the case of a single homogenous good 
when the intertemporal rate of substitution is not unity (that is, utility is not 
logarithmic), we get the general lesson that if  1 > ρ  and the world growth rate is 
positive, then households effectively discount future shares at a greater rate than 
implied simply by the discount rate in utility. 
3.  Real Exchange Rate Model 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2004, 2005) have argued that the correction of the US 
current account will require a large real depreciation. It is interesting to examine 
what the evolution of the real exchange rate would be if the current account deficit 
was optimal, reflecting expectations of growth in the US’s share of world-adjusted 
GDP. As in Obstfeld and Rogoff, we need to make some specific assumptions 
about preferences in order to derive results. 
In each country, we assume that preferences are a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over a 
non-traded consumption good, and a traded consumption aggregate: 
   (31) 
δ δ − =
1
Tt Nt t C C C
  ( ) ( )
δ δ −
=
1 * * *
Tt Nt t C C C . (32) 
The exact price indices are given by: 
   (33)  ) ) 1 ( (
1 1 − − − − =
δ δ δ δ δ δ Tt Nt t P P P
  () ( ) ) ) 1 ( (
1 1 * * * − − −
− =
δ δ δ δ
δ δ Tt Nt t P P P . (34) 
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Preferences over traded goods consumption are, in turn, a function of the 
consumption good produced in each country: 
 










































ε θ θ Ft Ht Tt C C C . (36) 
We assume here that preferences are symmetric, but that there is bias toward the 
consumption of the good produced locally ( 2 / 1 > θ ). 
Price indices are given by: 
  [] ε ε ε θ θ − − − − + = 1
1
1 1 ) 1 ( Ft Ht Tt P P P  (37) 
  [] ε ε ε θ θ − − − + − = 1
1
1 1 * ) 1 ( Ft Ht Tt P P P . (38) 
We have the following demand system:  
  t t
Tt
Ht















) 1 (  (39) 





* * ) 1 )( 1 ( t t
Tt
Ht













− − =  (41) 
  . (42) 
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t t Nt Nt C P C P δ =
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We do not need to write down the demand for the foreign-produced traded good. 
We can ignore that market, because by Walras’s law if the markets for the other 
three goods clear each period and the budget constraints are satisfied, then the 
market for the fourth good will also clear. 
The equilibrium conditions at time 0 and in the long run are as follows. We set the 
price of the foreign-traded good equal to one in each period. We also will consider 
the simple case in which net debt at time 0 is zero. That is because, in applying this 
model to the US to examine how its real exchange rate will evolve, we will use the 









































  0 Γ =δ γ Nt  (44) 
  . (45)  ) 1 ( 0
* Γ − =δ γ Nt
Here we have defined  Ht γ  and  Nt γ  to be the value of the home country’s output of 
traded goods and non-traded goods, respectively, as a share of the value of world 
output. It is helpful to notice from Equation (44) that because of the assumptions of 
unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution and unitary elasticity of substitution 
between non-traded and traded goods, the value of each country’s non-traded 
output as a share of world output is constant over time. We can write:  
  0 0, Γ − = Γ = δ γ γ δ γ t Ht N .  (46) 
Now, as in the previous sections, assume a slow increase in the home country’s 
output as a share of world output. Repeating Equations (9) and (10): 
  γ α γ α γ ) 1 ( 0
t t
t − + = . (9) 
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0 γ  and γ , we can use Equation (10) to derive  , and 
Equations (9) and (46) to derive 
0 Γ
Ht γ . Equation (43) can then be shown to be a 
quadratic equation in  , whose solution is:  t p
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γ Ht Ht Ht Ht Ht D C B A . 
We can then derive   by using  Ht P ε − = 1
1
t Ht p P . 
Ultimately, we are interested in calculating the home real depreciation over some 
time horizon from t to T,  t T Q Q , where  t t t P P
* ≡ Q  is the CPI real exchange rate 
(defined so that a home real depreciation is an increase in Q ). Using the 


























Q . (48) 
Since we are setting  , our solution for   allows us to solve for   and 
. 




Even though there is home bias in the consumption of the traded good, this is not a 
cause of the price of the home-produced traded good,  , changing over time. As 
we note below, in this model total consumption expenditure in both countries rises 
Ht P
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at the same rate, so the home bias does not put pressure on either traded goods 
price. But if the home country’s share of world output is growing, then output of 
the home-traded good is growing faster than the output of the foreign-traded good, 
so its price must be falling. 
What about the behaviour of the non-traded prices? If there were no home bias in 
consumption of the traded good, any change in the real exchange rate would have 
to come from movements in the relative non-traded prices. Indeed, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000, 2004, 2005) emphasise the importance of the non-traded sector. 
In our model of consumption, if the net factor income at time t is zero, from time t 
into the future we know that home and foreign nominal consumption will grow at 












= . (49) 
(We are starting in period t, and  t T > .) This result is actually quite general in the 
neoclassical model. That is, the result is based on the assumption that preferences 
are homothetic and that the intertemporal rate of substitution is the same in the two 
countries. This is less specific than the log specification that we have been using 
and does not require that preferences are the same in the two countries. 
Now under our assumption that there is a Cobb-Douglas utility function defined 
over traded and non-traded goods we can write: 










= , (50) 
where   is the price of the non-traded good, and Y  is the output of the non-
traded good. 
Nt P Nt
Now we can see how the price of non-traded goods at home changes relative to the 
price of non-traded goods in the foreign country: 
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The change in our non-traded price relative to the foreign non-traded price depends 
only on the growth rates of the non-traded goods. It does not depend at all on the 
shares of non-traded goods in consumption. 
While our optimising model can potentially explain a current account deficit if the 
country’s share of world output is expected to rise over time, under the Cobb-
Douglas assumption, none of that increase can come because the value of non-
traded output rises as a share of world output. We have noted that  Nt γ  is constant 
over time. The assumption that our share of world output is rising does not require 
any assumption on whether the home country’s non-traded output growth is faster 
or slower than in the rest of the world. 
We consider two models for ( ) ( )
* *
Nt NT Nt NT Y Y Y Y . The first is simply an 
endowment model, as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004). The second model is one in 
which output is produced using labour, and the growth rates of productivity in the 
traded and non-traded sector determine ( ) ( )
* *
Nt NT Nt NT Y Y Y Y . 
In that model, output of the traded sector in the home country is given by 
, and in the non-traded sector by Y Ht Ht Ht L A Y = ) ( Ht Nt Nt L L A − = . Here,  and 
 represent productivity, which may grow over time. These equations 
incorporate labour market equilibrium, with the assumption that the labour supply 
is fixed and equal to L. If labour markets are competitive, then we have 
Ht A
Nt A
Nt A Ht Ht Nt A P P = , or  Ht Nt Ht Nt P A A P ) ( = . Similarly in the foreign country, we 
get 
* * *
Nt Ft Nt A A P =
* *
Ft Nt P P = . 
We then have: 
 































Q . (52) 
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On the one hand, we have argued that if the home country’s output of the traded 
good is growing more quickly than the foreign country’s, then   must be falling. 




Ht P 1  term in Equation (52) must be rising. In addition, if 
there is home bias in consumption of traded goods, the ( ) Tt P
δ − 1 *
Tt P  term is also 
rising. Both contribute to a real depreciation for the home country. But working in 
the other direction is the fact that the relative growth in the home country’s traded 
output is coming from productivity growth in the traded sector. Unless home’s 
relative growth advantage in the non-traded sector is greater than its relative 
growth advantage in the traded sector, ( )
δ
) Nt / ( ) / (
* *
Ht Nt Ft A A A A will be falling. 
This is the standard Balassa-Samuelson effect. This latter effect might well 
outweigh the first two effects, so in net terms the home country could be 
experiencing a real appreciation along the adjustment path as its current account 
deficit declines. 
4.  Model Simulations 
4.1  Current Account 
We ask what the consequences are if the US consumer is expecting an increase in 
the US’s share of net world GDP. Specifically, we ask what the effects are of an 
expectation of an increase from its current share,  t γ , to some larger share, γ . We 
assume that the shares will evolve in an autoregressive fashion, with α  
determining the degree of serial correlation. In particular, if α  is large (close to 
one), then the growth in the GDP share will be slow. 
This model of GDP shares is given in Equation (9). We can use the result of 





























1 . (53) 
Note that the solution for the current account to GDP ratio does not depend on the 
absolute value of the GDP shares, but only the ratio of the long-run to the current 
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GDP share. So, the calibration does not depend on any measure of the US’s current 
share, but only on how much its share is expected to increase. 
This equation can be inverted to ask what assumption about the long-run increase 
in the US share of adjusted GDP could account for a current account deficit of 6 or 
7 per cent of (net) GDP. The deficit at the beginning of 2004 was around 
















− =  (54) 
Following usual calibration exercises, we will assume the annual discount factor in 
utility is  98 . 0 = β . If the increase in output shares is very gradual, so that 
95 . 0 = α , we find that in order to have  07 . 0 − =
V
t t Y CA , we need  098 . 1 = t γ γ . 
That is, if the US expects a gradual 10 per cent (not 10 percentage points) increase 
in its share of world GDP, then a current account deficit of 7 per cent of (net) GDP 
can be optimal. 
That seems like a very large increase in the output share, but it is approximately 
the size of the increase the US has experienced over the past 15 years, according to 
Figure 1. If the US share is going to gradually rise by this much, with an 
autoregressive coefficient of 0.95, then the growth over the next 25 years in the 
share would need to be about 7.1 per cent. That is, if US consumers are expecting 
the share of US net GDP to grow by 7.1 per cent over the next 25 years (with an 
eventual cumulative growth of 9.8 per cent), then the entire current account deficit 
of the US could be explained by optimal consumption behaviour, without any 
reference to investment spending or government spending. 
But Figure 1 only records the US share of adjusted G7 GDP. It may be less 
plausible that the US share would grow as fast if it were compared to world GDP. 
On the other hand, we have noted that some of the fastest growing countries in the 
rest of the world have high saving rates, so that their current accounts are actually 
in surplus. If their saving rates were to remain high, then the US deficit now may 
be optimal even if the US share of world output is not expected to grow. For 
example, if we use Equation (22) to assess this possibility, then assuming  98 . 0 = β  
but only a slightly higher level for  , the model predicts a current account deficit 
* β
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of 7  per  cent of (net) GDP. Specifically, we need  07 . 1 1 = − −
W β β 1 , which 
implies a value of  . If US GDP is approximately 20 per cent of world 
GDP, then the rest of the world’s discount factor would need to equal 0.9816. That 
is, only a small difference between the US and rest of world discount factor is 
needed to account for a large current account deficit. 
9813 . 0 =
W β
t γ γ
4.2  Real Exchange Rate 
Now suppose we take it as given that the assumption that the long-term growth in 
the US share is given by  098 . 1 = , so that  07 . 0 − =
V
t t Y CA  is optimal (with 
no difference in discount factors between US and foreign households). What will 
the evolution of prices look like in such a model? 
In addition to assuming  98 . 0 = β  and  95 . 0 = α , we need to make assumptions 
regarding the degree of home bias in consumption of traded goods, the share of 
non-traded goods in consumption, and the elasticity of substitution between home 
and foreign goods. We choose these to be  7 . 0 = θ , 75 . 0 = δ  and  6 = ε , 
respectively, to match the assumptions of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004). 
As we have discussed above, the calibration of the real exchange rate depends on 
the model that we use for output growth. In the endowment model, we must make 
an assumption about ( ) ( )
* *
Nt NT Nt NT Y Y Y Y , the growth rate of the home endowment 
of the non-traded good compared to the foreign endowment. Let us suppose that 
the horizon for comparison is 10 years – we would like to know what the change in 
the US real exchange rate will be over the next 10 years. In an endowment model, 
a generous assumption would be that the US non-traded share would rise relative 
to the foreign non-traded share by 10 per cent in 10 years. Under that assumption, 
the overall real depreciation for the US in 10 years will be only 15.5 per cent. 
If instead we take a model in which factors are mobile between the sectors that 
produce traded goods and non-traded goods within each country, then 
Equation (52) determines the real depreciation over this period. As we have noted, 
this model could conclude that there will be a real appreciation rather than a real 
depreciation for the US. As in the Balassa-Samuelson model, if the US’s traded 
sector is more productive, then the relative price of its non-traded goods will rise. 
Working in the other direction are the economic forces that tend to drive the prices 
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of US traded goods down relative to the prices of traded goods in the rest of the 
world. 
We must make an assumption about the magnitude of the change in 
) / ( ) / (
* *
Nt Ht Nt Ft A A A A : the productivity of the rest of the world’s traded sector 
relative to its non-traded sector, compared in turn to the same productivity ratio in 
the US. We will assume that the US traded sector shows a 10 per cent 
improvement compared to the rest of the world over the next 10 years. Under this 
assumption, there is virtually no change in the US real exchange rate. The model 
implies a real appreciation of 0.7 per cent over 10 years. 
So, contrary to the findings of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), if the US current 
account deficit reflects expectations of an increase in the US’s future share of 
world GDP, and if the reduction of the US current account deficit occurs as part of 
an optimal adjustment path, then the required change in the US real exchange rate 
might be quite small. 
5.  Conclusions 
At this stage, our results are very preliminary. We have presented a model and 
provided rough calibrations that suggest that there may be some role for an 
expected rise in the US share of world GDP in explaining the high US current 
account deficit of recent years. We present plausible scenarios in which modest 
continued growth in the US share of world growth could justify high US external 
borrowing today. We acknowledge, however, that there is a great deal of 
uncertainty about the future path of the US share of world output. 
Our forthcoming Carnegie-Rochester study will examine this model more 
carefully. It will also estimate a stochastic process for the US share of net GDP, 
and ask whether the US current account can be seen as being derived from this 
optimising model. We will also take a much longer horizon on the US current 
account deficit and implement tests much like those that Bohn (2004) uses to 
examine the sustainability of the US government budget deficits. 
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